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FILING OF RESPONSE
Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Petition for Writ of
Certiorari is filed purusant to Rule 47, R. Utah S. Ct.

REPLY TO DEFENDANTS1 STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants' statement of facts is obviously not meant to
be a comprehensive summary of the material facts on which
this case is based.

For purposes of determining whether

Berube v. Fashion Centre Inc. Ltd., 77il P.2d 1033 (Utah
1989), should be given retroactive application, the factual
details are probably not material.

(Tike material facts are

laid out in detail in Plaintiff's original appral brief to
the Utah Court of Appeals.)
However, Fact No. 3 in Defendants' statement requires a
response.

The statement is imcomplete and, therefore,

inaccurate because it is misleading.

plaintiff Gilmore was

hired by Defendant Salt Lake Community Action Program on
March 6, 1974, in the temporary position of accountant.
There is no question that at this poin^ Gilmore was indeed
an at-will employee.

However, on or atiout September 9,

1974, he was promoted to the position df fiscal director in
a probationary status.

He became a permanent employee in

the position of fiscal director on or dbout January 1, 1975.
[These facts are uncontroverted.

See R. 53-54.

See also

Position & Salary Record and Requests f|or Salary Payroll
Change documents, which are included ii Schultz deposition

Exhibit P-36 and Gilmore deposition Exhibit D-3.]

It was

when Gilmore became a permanent employee that his employment
relationship with Defendants began to be covered by the
personnel policies manual.

The fact that he was originally

a temporary at-will employee does not affect the fact that
when he bacame a permanent employee both he and the
Defendants became bound by the terms of the policy manual.

SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT
The general rule is that the ruling of the court states
the nature of the law both retroactively and prospectively.
Utah departs from retroactive application only when it can
be shown that parties would have justifiably relied on
previous law or decisions or when retroactive application
would unduly burden the administration of justice.
Defendants have made no claim that they ever relied on a
belief that they did not have to comply with the personnel
policies manual they voluntarily promulgated.

Nor have they

shown that a retroactive application of Berube would unduly
burden the administration of justice.

They have claimed

that it would unduly burden them but that has never been
recognized as a reason to refuse retroactive application of
a ruling.
To deny retroactive application of Berube would penalize
Gilmore for not getting to the courthouse first.
To apply Berube retroactively would do nothing more than
hold the Defendants to the promises they made.

Their only

argument against that would be that they never intended to
be bound by their promises, an argument that obvioulsy
cannot be accepted.

REPLY TO DEFENDANTS1 ARGUMENT
THE BERUBE CASE SHOULD APPLY RETROACTIVELY TO
THE INSTANT CASE.
In reversing the lower court's summary judgment for
Defendants, the Utah Court of Appeals

elied on Berube v.

Fashion Centre Inc. Ltd, supra, a case whose facts and
course in the lower court are remarkably similar to the
instant case.

Defendants, in their p^+-^ion to this court

for writ of certiorari, argue that Berikbe should not be
applied retroactively to the instant c^se.

In so arguing,

Defendants have quoted so selectively irrom among cases on
the subject of retroactivity that the picture presented can
at best be described as incomplete.
Defendants, for instance, ignore Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d
661 (Utah 1984), a significant Utah ca^e on the question of
retroactivity and a case similar to th^ instant case
concerning that issue.

In Malan, the Jjower court granted

summary judgment to defendants on the grounds that the Utah
Guest Statute (which had previously be^n held constitutional) precluded plaintiff's suit.

Dn appeal, the Utah

Supreme Court reversed earlier positioris that the Guest
Statute was constitutional, held the s^tute
unconstitutional and ordered a trial fo|r plaintiffs.

Defendants petitioned for a rehearing, contending that the
ruling that the statute was now unconstitutional should be
applied prospectively only.

The court denied the petition

for rehearing, defining the Utah position on retroactivity:
The general rule from time immemorial is that
the ruling of a court is deemed to state the true
nature of the law both retroactively and
prospectively... in the vast majority of cases a
decision is effective both prospectively and
retrospectively, even an overruling
decision...Whether the general rule should be
departed from depends on whether a substantial
injustice would occur...
We may, in our discretion, prohibit retroactive
operation where the 'overruled law has been
justifiably relied upon or where retroactive
operation creates a burden.' Loyal Order of Moose,
657 P.2d at 265...
The defendants in this case do not argue that
they justifiably
relied on our prior
decisions
sustaining
the constitutionality
of the Guest
Statute.
There is no evidence that the
defendants
knew of the Guest Statute and relied upon it in
offering
a ride to the plaintiff.
The bare
assertion
by defendants
that our decision
overrules
prior cases sustaining
the constitutionality
of the
Guest Statute
is insufficient
to prohibit
its
retroactive

application.

[At 676; emphasis added.]

MaIan was quoted and followed in the later case of Belden
v. Dalbo Inc., 752 P.2d 1317 (Uth App. 1988).
The Defendants rely on McFarland v. Skaggs Companies
Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984), where the court discussed
whether a new actual malace standard should be applied
prospectively only.

The court did discuss the general rule

as quoted in Defendants1 petition but Defendants failed to
quote the application

of the general rule in that case. The

court declined to limit the application of the new standard
to future cases only, pointing out:

"There is no showing of

reliance upon the former standard or cjf any resulting burden
to the administration of justice.

We therefore hold that

the Sunburst doctrine does not preclude application of the
new 'actual malace' standard in the present case." [At 305.]
Likewise, in the instant case, Defplants have shown no
reliance on the pre-Berube standard nor have they shown any
great burden on the administration of justice that would
result from a retroactive application if Berube.

Under the

MaIan case, their bare assertions are insufficient to
prohibit retroactive application.

If Plaintiff Gilmore

prevails, the fact that Defendants would face "the
possibility of judgment for Gilmore*s back pay in a
catastrophic amount" (as they describe it in their petition)
is not the type of burden on the administration of justice
that a prospective-only-application is designed to avoid.
It may be a burden on Defendants but i^ is not a burden on
the administration of justice.

Defendants could have

avoided such a "catastrophic" burden simply by following the
rules that they themselves promulgated and discharging
Gilmore properly.

See Timpanogos Planrjing & Water

Management v. Central Utah Water Conservancy District, 690
P.2d 562 (Utah 1984), for a discussior on what constitutes a
burden on the administration of justice.
In Timpanogos, members of certain boards had been
appointed by a method later found unconstitutional.

The

court ruled that giving that determination retroactive
application would call into question al|l of the actions

taken by the board and would unreasonably burden the
administration of justice.
in the instant case.

That would not be the situation

The Supreme Court in MaIan

specifically rejected Timpanogos as support for a
prospective-only-appiication of the Guest Statute ruling,
pointing out that the ruling in Timpanogos was prospective
only because of the actual reliance on the statute by
various entities.
The Supreme Court had earlier discussed the standards
concerning retroactivity in criminal cases in Andrews v.
Morris, 677 P.2d 81 (Utah 1983), and "explicitely
adopted[ed] the following analytic standards for determining
the retroactivity of new rules...:1) the purpose to be
served by the new rule; 2) the extent of reliance on the old
rule, and 3) the effect on the administration of justice of
a retoractive application of the new rule. " [At 91.]
Although these were the standards for examining the
question in a criminal case, they can easily be adapted in
the analysis of a civil case.
Defendants cite Bimbo v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial
Hospital, 644 F.Supp. 1033 (D.N.J. 1986), as support for
their claim that courts in other jurisdictions have ruled
that modifications to the employment at will doctine will
operate prospectively only.

In Bimbo, the federal court in

New Jersey refused prospective application of a New Jersey
Supreme Court case, Woolley v.Hoffman-LaRoche Inc., 491 A.2d
1257 (N.J. 1985), which had for the first time recognized an

exception to the at-will doctrine bas^H on a contract
implied from a policy manual (as Berufle has done in Utah).
However, the New Jersey state court specifically rejected
this federal court interpretation of ijts law in Cole v.
Carteret Savings Bank, 540 A. 2d 923 (Nl. J. Super .L. 1988):
"This court respectfully disagrees with that holding [in
Bimbo] and concludes that the Supreme 3ourt in Woolley
intended to include all claimants."

T|ie court also pointed

out that the New Jersey Supreme Court in Rutherford
Education Assn. v. Board of Ed., 489 A|. 2d 1148 (N.J. 1985),
had thoroughly analyzed the retroactive-prospective
application of its decisions:
Not only is it made clear that retoractive
application is presumed, but a rerview of the
various factors the court listed to apply in such
test, makes it abundantly clear that a breach of an
implied contract
would be the type of
justifiable
claim that would be
considered retroactively.
[At
927; emphasis added.]
The propsective application of the Wpoley case was
explored again in Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharmeceutical, 545
A.2d 185 (N.J.Super.A.D. 1988):
The theory underpinning prospective
application of important changes in the law is that
retroactivity is unfair to those who relied on the
prior state of the law...Here, plaintiffs contend
that Ortho voluntarily published a set of employment
promises in the manual upon which the plaintiffs
relied and that Ortho failed to live up to those
promises. Assuming that these claims are
established, Ortho1s only unfairness defense to the
retroactive application of Wooley would have to be
that it never intended to live up to the promises
contained in the manual it published, and upon which
its employes allegedly relied. That argument will
not wash. If plaintiffs
are proved, there would be

nothing unfair about holding Ortho to
standards it voluntarily
promulgated.

workplace
[At 189;

emphasis added.]

Defendants also cite Virgil v. Arzola, 699 P.2d 613 (N.M.
App. 1983), for their prospective-only-application position.
Two earlier New Mexico cases, Forrester v. Parker, 606 P.2d
648 (N.M. 1980), and Hernandez v. Home Educ. Livelihood
Program, 645 P.2d 1381 (N.M. App. 1982), had recognized
employee manuals as a basis for breach of employment
contract claims (as Berube did).

In neither of these cases

did the courts refuse retroactive application of the ruling.
In Virgil it was a new tort cause of action for retaliatory
discharge based on public policy to which the court gave a
"modified prospective application.'1

What Defendants fail

to point out to this court in their petition is that the New
Mexico Supreme Court explained and expanded on what was
meant by "modified prospective application" in the later
case of Boudar v. E.G. & G. Inc., 742 P.2d 491 (N.M. 1987).
The court ruled that the Virgil holding (recognizing the new
public policy exception to the at-will doctine) was to be
applicalble to all cases filed on or before the date of the
Virgil opinion so long as trial of the case had not been
completed before the date of the Virgil opinion.
493.]

[At 492-

Therefore, even if this court were to adopt the

Virgil position of modified prospective application, Berube
would apply to the Gilmore case.

On page 11 of their petition Defendants cite four cases
where rulings were given prospective Application only.
shed any light on the instant questior}.

None

Merely listing past

cases where prospective-application-onjly was ordered is not
support for prospect ive-only-applicati|on in a later case.
It is the reasoning why prospective-on|ly-application was
denied or ordered that is significant land Defendants cannot
show any reasoning in those cases cite^l that is applicable
to the instant case.
It is also interesting to note that the federal district
court in Utah has already been called |ipon to determine
whether Berube should be applied retroactively in Howcroft
v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. 712 F.Supp.
1514 (D.Utah 1989).

A hearing in that case was held prior

to Berube and the court had drafted a tentative opinion.
After Berube was entered, the court asfced for briefs taking
Berube into account.

Defendants argued that Berube should

not be applied retroactively but the court ruled:
In Berube, the Utah Supremb Court
implicitely determined that the decision was
to be applied retroactively. The court
remanded the case for trial on the newly
jrely
recognized theory instead of merely
.d be
announcing that the theory would
recognized in future cases. [Ai%
Jt 151!
1519.]
Plaintiff recognizes that the Utah Supreme Court is not
bound by the federal district court's interpretation of its
rulings but submits that the federal district court
correctly read the Berube ruling.

To refuse retroactive application of Berube to the
Gilmore case would be to penalize Gilmore for not getting to
the courthouse first.
at 492.

See Boudar v. E.G. & G. Inc., supra,

If Gilmore proves his claims, Defendants will only

be penalized for not living up to promises they voluntarily
promulgated in their personnel manual.

Griqoletti v. Ortho

Pharmeceutical, supra, at 189.

RELIEF SOUGHT
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully asks this
court:
1.

To deny Defendants' petition for writ of certiorari,

or, if the petition is granted, to rule that the Berube case
does have retroactive application;
2. To award Plaintiff costs pursuant to Rule 34, R. Utah
S. Ct.

DATED:

^ ~ ^^-~'S~ C \

DATED

,

f^-yf

^ -

Nann Novinski-Durando
Attorney for Plaintiff

Miner
Attorney for Plaintif
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Plaintiff! s Response to Defendants1 Peltition for Writ of
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